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WHY EVEN MIND?  
ON THE A PrIOrI VAluE Of “lIfE”
Amien Kacou
AbstrAct: This article presents an analysis of the matter of the “meaning” of life in terms of 
whether it should even be lived in the first place. It begins with an attempt at defining the 
question as an inquiry on the a priori value of attention in general, and develops into an axiological 
reflection distantly inspired from Martin Heidegger’s notion of “care.” The main objective of 
the article is (1) to “answer” the question (or to proceed as if the question could be answered) 
objectively by “playing along” with its naïve logic—that is, by finding a basis for comparing 
the good that can be found a priori in life (mainly, pleasure) with the good that can be found 
a priori in death (mainly, the absence of pain)—and, then, (2) to suggest why we have no good 
reason to feel dissatisfied with where this leaves us (i.e., possibly facing a certain specter of ethical 
foundationalism: the question of the “value of value”). Its basic conclusion is, assuming we are 
committed to assigning value to life in general, that we should be able to say that life is good 
irrespective of  any explanation for its existence.
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To be, or not to be,—that is the question:—
Whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer
The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune,
Or to take arms against a sea of troubles,
And by opposing end them?—To die, to sleep,—
No more; and by a sleep to say we end
The heart-ache, and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to,—‘tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish’d. To die, to sleep.1
There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is 
suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to 
answering the fundamental question of philosophy. All the rest—
whether or not the world has three dimensions, whether the mind 
has nine or twelve categories—comes afterward. These are games; 
one must first answer.2
     1. William Shakespeare, Hamlet, Prince of  Denmark, Act III, Scene 1.
     2. Albert Camus, The Myth of  Sisyphus And Other Essays, New York, Vintage Books, 1991, p. 3.
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INTrODuCTION: WHAT WE MEAN (VErY BASICAllY) AND WHY WE 
ASK
What we seek when we search for “the meaning of life” in the most basic or general 
sense (or for an answer to the timeless, general question, “why are we here?”) can be 
one or both of two things: either it is an explanation for the fact that “life” as we know it 
exists, or it is a justification for our most basic (or “default”) desire to live.
On the one hand, looking for an explanation “why” life exists may have to involve 
an onerous empirical investigation, theory-making, speculation, or even myth-making. 
It is an inquiry concerning natural history at best (cosmology, etc…). On the other 
hand, articulating a justification “why” we desire to live needs only involve the clarifica-
tion of a supposed rationality (or revelation of lack thereof) supporting one of the most 
significant “choices” we have already made (i.e., to survive). Our goal here is to do the 
latter—a more “humble” pursuit.
But why do it? What explains or justifies this desire to articulate a justification why 
we desire to live? Do we not agree that, “there are certain things one does not ask about: 
primary imperative of instinct?”3 Might our inquiry, then, not be only the expression 
of a sick, perhaps “depressed,” psyche, or a symptom of the degeneration of one of our 
most basic instincts? Might this also help explain why the legendary resonance of “the” 
question from the mouth of Hamlet, insane as he seemed, has elicited only aesthetic fas-
cination for the most part, instead of a greater moral demand to either seriously answer 
or dismiss it? Maybe. Indeed, why else would we have “sensed” (as we have at times) a 
vague danger or insanity about that “humble” question? However, the question has re-
mained, somehow. After all, it seems that the authority of these notions of health relates 
back to the authority of the principle that life ought to be preserved in the first place, 
which is precisely what we dare to question. Such circular appeal does little to dispel the 
troubling appearance of sense and meaningfulness in the question. Perhaps, what we 
need is to better understand how “wrong-headed” that question really is, if at all, and 
then also why, nonetheless, a thinker like Camus not only addressed it seriously, but also 
made it the question, elevating it to a level reminiscent of first Philosophy.
The explanation may well lie in the fact that some of us (including Hamlet, Camus 
and others) suffer through a special kind of stupidity. “Value judgments about life, for or 
against, can in the final analysis never be true; they have value only as symptoms, they 
can be considered only as symptoms—in themselves, such judgments are stupidities.”4 
What makes this characterization more compelling is, precisely, that it questions the ad-
equacy of our understanding.
Stupidity is to the psyche as filth is to the body: a Sisyphean problem, in one sense. 
And philosophy is that hygienic practice that we use, continually, against the never-
ending problem that natural stupidity presents—just as others use regular prayer or 
other rituals to purge their psyches, again and again, of similar curses, or as we all take 
     3. friedrich Nietzsche, Twilight of  the Idols, trans. richard Polt, Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 
1997, p. 77.
     4. Nietzsche, Twilight of  the Idols, p. 13 (emphasis added).
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regular showers to purge our bodies of the natural growth of filth. Thinkers of different 
inclinations have acknowledged aspects of this chronic susceptibility, and its relation to 
philosophy, in various ways. According to Wittgenstein, for instance, “human beings are 
deeply imbedded in philosophical – i.e. grammatical – confusions,”5 and “philosophy is 
a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language.”6 (Questions 
of understanding—meaning or the illusion of meaning—always involve questions about 
our relationship with language.) As for Deleuze, “[philosophy] is useful for harming stu-
pidity, for turning stupidity into something shameful. Its only use is the exposure of all 
forms of baseness of thought.”7
It is noteworthy, however, that not all stupidities are born equal: some reflect (and 
can be justified as) efforts to overcome the stupor of a new birth. In our modern case, it 
may have been the birth (or at least the early stages of conception) of what could now 
be called post-theism. (“God is dead.”) This may have been the destabilizing event. And 
if it was, then our inquiry can be explained as an aspect of our re-adjustment, and per-
haps even justified as an attempt at re-education.
I. WHAT WE MEAN (IN MOrE DETAIl)
regardless of whether or not we find that it is the “fundamental question” of philosophy,8 
we can see that judging whether life is or is not worth living is, in one sense at least, 
when understood with a general character, a fundamentally philosophical question. 
The question calls on the living individual to make a value judgment (which seems of 
the most serious extent) about the condition it most basically, most generally, and in a 
sense most intimately, “finds itself ” in—and in this sense, the question must be seen as 
a “personal” one.9 But the judgment called for only becomes especially interesting for 
philosophical exercise once we attempt to make it “objective,” so to speak.
On the one hand, from a “subjective” point of view, the question whether life is or is 
not worth living reduces simply to the question whether or not—or how—we the living 
already in fact, in our variable situations, desire or not to live. Its answer is a function of 
descriptions of motivational dispositions as they may vary from individual to individual 
and circumstance to circumstance. (for instance, some may find certain cases of eutha-
nasia justified, or find certain forms of suicide honorable.) In other words, from a subjec-
tive point of view, the answer would simply be that life is worth living to the extent that, 
while we could have a different attitude, we just happen to want it (to be disposed towards 
it), perhaps in light of circumstantial considerations. And, thus, the question could be 
     5. ludwig Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, German English Scholars’ Edition: TS 213, trans. C.G. luckhardt 
and M.A.E. Aue (eds.), Malden, Blackwell Publishing, 2005, p. 417. 
     6. ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, 3rd ed., Prentice Hall, 1973, 
p. 47.
     7. Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. Hugh Tomlinson, london, Althone Press, 1983, p. 106. 
     8. for instance, it may be that, “what can be said?” is a more fundamental question—assuming there truly 
exists such hierarchy between questions of philosophy.
     9. One might say, but in a somewhat informal sense: it is an “existential” question.
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quickly addressed in some cases, without much need for philosophical inquiry—except 
perhaps on collateral issues. Similarly, typical answers referring simply to how “fun” or 
“beautiful” life is, or (perhaps the contemporary scientist’s favorite) how “fascinating” or 
“mysterious”—these answers are, as stated, inadequate for our purposes, to the extent 
that they are primitive (uncritical) generalizations expressing our preexisting desire for 
(or infatuation with) life.
On the other hand, from a point of view that purports to be “objective,” we must 
have a more complex approach. We must “problematize” the value of life in general. 
The question is not simply whether (or how, or even why in the broad sense of an ex-
planation) we happen to desire or not to live, but rather whether (or why in the narrow 
sense of a justification) we should or should not ever desire to live in the first place.
a. The objective approach
In seeking a justification, we must look, beyond the mere “freedom” (or given-ness) of 
any primitive desire, for something like a final “authority” that we could show through 
some fact or logical inference10 to make us “right” (i.e., as a matter of reasoning) to have 
such a desire. In other words, we must try to present life as being instrumental or not 
to some uncontested value (or purpose)—and, thus, as either “useful” or “futile.” In this 
sense, the word “meaningful” (pertaining to life) would be basically synonymous with 
the word “useful”—a relation between objects and moments, on the one hand, and how 
what we value can be served, on the other hand. 
In addition, we do not look for conditions that would sustain or increase the value 
of a proposed venture; we look for a demonstration that the venture can have any value. 
Accordingly, in order to find the objective position, we must avoid in our picture of life 
or death any variable circumstance that could be taken to make either one of them ar-
bitrarily more or less attractive or pursuable. furthermore, any description of how we 
desire to live may well entail conditions under which we would not prefer to live. But 
even if such conditions exist, it does not necessarily follow that life is without value when 
those conditions prevail. Indeed, by analogy, that we would prefer ten dollars to five 
dollars if we could choose does not mean at all that the five dollars would then have no 
value. Other example: that we would happily accept an ice cream cone if it were free 
but refuse it if we had to pay for it does not mean at all that ice cream has no value to 
us. The distinction can be expressed as follows: the value of ice cream in light of its cost, 
we call its a posteriori value; the value of ice cream irrespective of its cost, we call its a 
priori value.
What we seek in this inquiry is the a priori value of life-as-such—the value that sub-
sists in, or is essential to, or is the initial value in, any life, irrespective of its circumstanc-
     10. By “logical inference,” we mean simply this: for instance, if you find that it is too cold outside, then, the 
logical inference is that a priori (i.e., assuming there are no other considerations), you should dress warmly 
if you go out. (An example of an a posteriori condition could be this: you have just made a bet with a friend 
that you could go out naked in the cold for one hour.) The terms a priori and a posteriori are defined more 
specifically below.
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es, including, to any extent possible, any explanation for its existence.11  (The objective 
question calls for an a priori answer.) In contrast, we are not interested in questions such 
as whether seppuku is honorable or how end-of-life decisions should be made. (The sub-
jective question, the question of circumstances and the a posteriori answer coincide.)
Although we do not intend to structure our arguments very rigidly below, it should 
be clear that the groundwork for this inquiry is primarily “analytical”—not necessarily 
in the doctrinal or academic sense, but rather in the sense that our primary purpose is 
elucidatory. Nietzsche said, “One would have to occupy a position outside of life, and 
on the other hand to know it as well as one, as many, as all who have lived it, in order to 
be allowed even to touch upon the problem of the value of life.”12 We do not use the word 
“objective” to claim an independent point of view in an empirical inquiry, however—
indeed, we disregard empirical circumstances. Our intent here could be limited to ana-
lyzing the concepts of “life” and “value” in order to show or suggest any logical relation 
between them. “Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor 
deduces anything.”13 The appropriate response to the “problem” of the a priori value of 
life (including an understanding that it is beyond question and that the “problem” must 
disappear) could become evident as either a direct or an incidental effect of our attempts 
to demonstrate or articulate that value. In fact, ideally, our “conclusions” should be seen 
as “platitudes,” undeserving in hindsight of any meticulous development that would 
have preceded them—platitudes that for whatever psychological cause (say, stupidity) 
failed to be immediately obvious. It is in this “senselessness” alone that we will attempt 
to show “truth,” in or through our judgments of value, for or against life. But, before we 
can begin, a last touch of philosophical housekeeping is in order. We must narrow down 
what we mean by “life.”
b. “Life” as psychological experience in general
Is it “organic existence” as such? Not necessarily. Our interest here is not primarily 
in articulating the value we find in distinguishing organisms (including bacteria) from 
non-organic objects—say, as presenting a “remarkable” cosmological phenomenon. 
Nor is our interest primarily in deciding in the abstract whether the body of a brain-
dead person is worth sustaining, or in deciding whether our economic gain is ever worth 
sacrificing the participation of another human in the world. As aforesaid, we approach 
the question whether life is or is not worth living as a personal question, a question 
about our own, perhaps ubiquitous, pursuit of first-person living—personal life. In other 
words, our interest here is narrowly in deciding whether we, as deliberate attendees in 
this phenomenal world have any reason14 to be or remain in attendance—regardless of 
any possible implication on those other matters. We seek a demonstration, as it were, 
     11. When we speak of the a priori value of life, we cannot be speaking of the a priori “value” of a variable—as 
when we try to speak of the a priori time on a clock. (There can be no such thing.)
     12. Nietzsche, Twilight of  the Idols, p. 28.
     13. ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 50.
     14. Just as, again, one has a reason to dress warmly when it is cold.
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that life is generally worth the least amount or threshold of the attention (or effort) that 
it involves—inasmuch as attention or effort represents what we can “give” when alive for 
whatever value we find. In short, we seek a basic reason to pay attention to the world.
Hence, ultimately, by “the value of life,” we really mean the value of attention in 
general, or conscious “participation,” or conscious presence, or conscious existence in 
general, or perhaps what Heidegger called dasein (being-there). In short, “life” is con-
sciousness itself (awareness, psychological experience).15 Therefore, our main question 
(on the a priori value of first-person living) can be rephrased as follows: whether or not 
there is a priori logical reason to have or sustain even the minimum of attention in the 
world. Hence our title: why even mind? (A perhaps more illustrative way to think about 
this is to ask, as Hamlet did in a way: if we could be in, or go to, dreamless sleep forever, 
why should we care at all to be or stay awake?)
II. “PlEASurE” AS THE MOST GENErAl SIGN Or PHENOMENON Of 
GOODNESS IN lIfE
When we determine something objectively present by merely looking at it, this has 
the character of care just as much as a “political action,” or resting and having a 
good time.16
One needs not decipher Heidegger to recognize a logical relation between caring 
about things, on the one hand, and paying attention to the world (such as by looking at 
things in visual space), on the other. In fact, we can begin to answer our main question, 
whether or not there is a priori logical reason to pay even the minimum of attention to 
the world, with a platitude that expresses such a relation: we have a priori logical reason 
to pay attention to the world in any world where (1) we value (care about) anything at 
all, and (2) paying attention favors or could favor what we value.
What could be a sufficient representation of something we value, for our purposes? 
let us take the example of security. It might be noted, for instance, that paying atten-
tion to, including thinking about, the world can further our security interests in gener-
al simply by ameliorating our capacity for orientation away from undesirable circum-
stances—be they possible in proximate space or more remotely. But appealing to such 
interests as a justification for staying alive (awake, attentive), at this point in our inquiry, 
would beg the question of elucidating their instrumental value. After all, it is precisely a 
security interest (that in our lives or persons—our personal survival) that is being ques-
tioned in this inquiry. In other words, an appeal to the “orientational” (indirect, exter-
nal) value of attention at this stage would only show us to our starting point. 
In contrast, questions as to the instrumental value of pleasure, even in its most 
vulgar concept, do not seem likely to cause a problem—even though pleasure can be 
     15. When we use the word “attention,” it is often to emphasize this attribute of  “deliberateness” in conscious 
living, which is really what is on trial here. But we should ignore any doubt as to whether consciousness is 
distinct from, and can subsist in the absence of, any meaningful (sensed) attention.  
     16. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. Joan Stambaugh, New York, SuNY, 1996, p. 180. 
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theorized to have an (external) instrumental value, such as a biological function for in-
stance. (In the vulgar concept, pleasure is a necessarily discrete, temporary experience, 
which can even be seen as a distraction from “higher” pursuits.) That is because there is 
“immediacy,” so to speak, in the value of pleasure: it has a dimension more akin to that 
of what we might call a “final” good, a thing good in or for itself. Indeed, one needs not 
contemplate anything behind pleasure to value it: it has intrinsic (direct, internal) value. 
In contrast, the same cannot be said about the value of worry or fear—which expresses 
security interests. The reason for that might be this: pleasure is itself a form of satisfac-
tion of desire; worry or fear is not. Worry or fear is not worth having (better yet, worth 
not having) unless it is conducive to something else. If the value of pleasure in its vulgar 
concept is ever questioned at all, it is typically by comparison with value that is supposed 
to exist outside of it, the pursuit of which might happen to come into conflict with the 
pursuit of pleasure. But, that some value can be found in pleasure (i.e., that it is “found 
good”—that all people who have it must like it to some extent) is beyond reasonable 
dispute. Therefore, we can use the concept of pleasure as a sufficient representation of 
something we value.
furthermore, that manner of finding things good that is in pleasure can certainly 
not exist in any world without consciousness (i.e., without “life,” as we now understand 
the word)—slight analogies put aside. In fact, we can begin to develop a more sophisti-
cated definition of the concept of “pleasure,” in the broadest possible sense of the word, 
as follows: it is the common psychological element in all psychological experience of 
goodness (be it in joy, admiration, or whatever else). In this sense, pleasure can always 
be pictured to “mediate” all awareness or perception or judgment of goodness: there is 
pleasure in all consciousness of things good; pleasure is the common element of all con-
scious satisfaction. In short, it is simply the very experience of liking things, or the liking 
of experience, in general. In this sense, pleasure is, not only uniquely characteristic of 
life but also, the core expression of goodness in life—the most general sign or phenomenon 
for favorable conscious valuation, in other words. This does not mean that “good” is 
absolutely synonymous with “pleasant”—what we value may well go beyond pleasure. 
(The fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the experience of liking things.) 
However, what we value beyond pleasure remains a matter of speculation or theory. 
Moreover, we note that a variety of things that may seem otherwise unrelated are cor-
related with pleasure—some more strongly than others. In other words, there are many 
things the experience of which we like. for example: the admiration of others; sex; or 
rock-paper-scissors. But, again, what they are is irrelevant in an inquiry on a priori val-
ue—what gives us pleasure is a matter for empirical investigation.
Thus, we can see now that, in general, something primitively valuable is attainable 
in living—that is, pleasure itself. And it seems equally clear that we have a priori logical 
reason to pay attention to the world in any world where pleasure exists. Moreover, we 
can now also articulate a foundation for a security interest in our life: since the good of 
pleasure can be found in living (to the extent pleasure remains attainable),17 and only in 
     17. Whether pleasure always remains attainable in life can be considered under Parts III and IV below.
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living, therefore, a priori, life ought to be continuously (and indefinitely) pursued at least 
for the sake of preserving the possibility of finding that good.
However, this platitude about the value that can be found in life turns out to be, at 
this point, insufficient for our purposes. It seems to amount to very little more than rec-
ognizing that our subjective desire for life in and of itself shows that life has some objec-
tive value. for what difference is there between saying, “living is unique in benefiting 
something I value (namely, my pleasure); therefore, I should desire to go on living,” and 
saying, “I have a unique desire to go on living; therefore I should have a desire to go on 
living,” whereas the latter proposition immediately seems senseless? In other words, “life 
gives me pleasure,” says little more than, “I like life.” Thus, we seem to have arrived at 
the conclusion that the fact that we already have some (subjective) desire for life shows 
life to have some (objective) value. But, if that is the most we can say, then it seems our 
enterprise of justification was quite superficial, and the subjective/objective distinction 
was useless—for all we have really done is highlight the correspondence between value 
and desire. Perhaps, our inquiry should be a bit more complex.
We may have to think beyond the fact that bare life has some value a priori—the fact 
that there is some value in any life—(which basically gets us back to the fact that we al-
ready have some desire for it or that we can have pleasure in it), and consider the possi-
bility that there might be some value in not living also, and that it might be greater than 
or cancel out the value we find to be primitively characteristic of life. (This would not 
be an a posteriori or circumstantial comparison, nonetheless, because life and death are 
basically logical extensions of one another—like “p” and “not-p.”)
This last question invites two approaches—perhaps only nominally distinct. One is 
to ask whether, where life (with the desire for life) already exists, there is also something 
primitively, and then relatively, desirable about dying: something that would be a priori 
preferable to that which we already desire in staying alive. Simply put: in general, would 
dying be better than living? (This concerns the value of our survival.) 
Just as we have assumed pleasure to be something primitively desirable attainable 
in living, we can assume the absence of pain (of displeasure) to be something primitively 
desirable attainable in death. (On the model of pleasure, we adopt a broad definition of 
pain: it is dissatisfaction with consciousness, or the experience of disliking things.) 
Ideally, we would be able to answer any call to judge the value of life (a priori or a 
posteriori) by simply balancing the good and bad it involves as follows: (1) the “amount” 
of present bad plus the odds of future bad, against (2) the “amount” of present good 
plus the odds of future good. This comparison would require two assumptions: (1) equal 
amounts of good and bad neutralize each other, and (2) any moment in life (outside of 
“heaven” or “hell” at least) always preserves the possibility of both future good and future 
bad. Accordingly, in terms of pleasure and pain, our question on the value of life over 
death could be reframed as follows: whether the absence of pain (present and future) 
guaranteed by death is worth losing all access to pleasure (present and future) included 
in life a priori when such access also involves access to pain.18 
     18. As the french-speaker ordinarily puts it: la vie vaut-elle la peine d’être vécue (i.e., is life worth the pain of 
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The other approach is to consider whether it can ever make sense to say that it 
would have been better, or even “just as well,” if we had never come to life in the first 
place—if experience had never appeared. (This concerns the value of our birth.) Ac-
cording to Cioran, “not to be born is undoubtedly the best plan of all. unfortunately it 
is within no one’s reach.”19  But can his point be disputed in a reasoned manner? The 
issue can be framed as follows: whether the mere fact that experience exists can be said 
to be a good or a bad thing.
Before we can tackle these questions properly, however, we must return to the sense 
of Heidegger’s remark (in the epigraph above). What Heidegger was emphasizing is that 
consciousness does not merely incidentally support value, as if it were an external (inci-
dental) agent—like a rock may serve the one who throws it. Since it does not necessarily 
follow that there is no consciousness without pleasure from the fact there is no pleas-
ure without consciousness, we might be tempted to infer that value in general might be 
only an occasional “entertainment” of consciousness. Instead, Heidegger points out that 
consciousness, in and of itself, presupposes and always is an expression—not a detached 
medium—of value, or “care” (i.e., an expression of “interest in things,” one might say). 
let us elucidate what “care” signifies (for our purposes, at least) and how consciousness 
expresses it.
III. AxIOlOGY
It is not only the case that all desire invokes a question of value, but also that only desire 
creates value: there is no value beyond the desirable; all value is a function of some 
desire. for instance, the value of health comes from the fact that we desire survival, and 
pleasure, and offspring, etc… Consider: although what is desirable may sometimes re-
quire elucidation, what we cannot recognize in any way to be (or to further) something 
desirable, we simply cannot recognize as being valuable.20
a. The importance of  difference
To value anything is to care about something, to have desires (wants) for things, to have 
preferences over things; and to have a preference entails caring about a difference in the 
way things can be—favoring one contingent way for things to be over another. (This re-
flects the essential axiological dichotomy between good and bad.) 
Where there is no difference in the way things can be (no contingency), there also 
can be no preference one way or another—there can only be indifference. Note that 
this seems to entail that a “heaven” where nothing bad can occur is impossible—and the 
same for a “hell” where nothing good can occur. (Certainly, the notion of a heaven or 
being lived)?
     19. Emile Cioran, The Trouble with Being Born, trans. richard Howard, New York, Arcade Publishing, 1998, 
p. 223.
     20. Compare Albert Camus, The Myth of  Sisyphus And Other Essays, p. 51 (“what can a meaning outside my 
condition mean to me?”).
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hell leaving its inhabitants in indifference is oxymoronic.)
b. Awareness
loosely speaking, care manifests itself either in what one “undergoes” or in what one 
“does”—it has both passive and active expressions. More explicitly, the capacity for 
caring consists in being disposed to feel or sense or otherwise behave with preference—
again, regardless of whether or not we “know” our own preference (that is, whether or 
not as bearers of particular preferences we have a clear and distinct, definite and accu-
rate concept or understanding of them).21
feeling and sensing are ways of behaving with preference. (Thus, speaking of one’s 
having “feelings of preference” for something would be redundant, at least strictly speak-
ing.) All feeling is a sign of caring; it is or carries an expression of preference. All aware-
ness presupposes caring about the way things are or can be.22 In Heidegger’s words: 
“care lies ‘before’ every factical ‘attitude’ and ‘position’ of dasein, that is, it is always al-
ready in them as an existential a priori.”23 In other words, we could say that interest in 
things “precedes” (to use a Sartrian term) awareness of things—and the attendant for-
mation of propositional attitudes. Better yet, it engenders those other kinds of phenomena. 
All belief, for instance, as a species of propositional attitude, is produced ultimately for 
the business of some desire. In sum, the existence of desire generally explains the exist-
ence of consciousness and attitudes—desire goes beyond experience. Hence, it would be 
impossible to have consciousness without a sense of good and bad: a perfectly axiologi-
cally indifferent state of consciousness is perfectly impossible.
Hence, awareness can be thought of as part of a simply inestimably larger condition 
of interest in things. (Again: the fact that we value things needs not be reduced to the 
experience of liking things.) from the restrictive point of view of a reductionist material-
ist (if she is also a functionalist perhaps), this condition could be distinguished as merely 
a way that organic entities distinguish themselves from the rest of Nature. (One could 
say that awareness is for those entities a device favored through evolution for bettering 
their chances of biological “success”—notably, by ameliorating their capacity for spatial 
orientation, as suggested earlier.) Alternatively, the condition could be that of a larger, 
more comprehensive entity for which organic life represents nothing but one avatar—
e.g., Schopenhauer’s “Will,” or a pantheist’s “God.” These explanatory speculations, 
however, are still beyond our inquiry. 
Overall, it now appears that consciousness is inherently, always, “value-entertain-
     21. We may often lack the language to express, or the capacity to appreciate, the complexity of the 
considerations required to best serve our preferences—which we may be described to sense ordinarily with 
some degree of vagueness.
     22. The “fabric” of awareness could be imagined as a roundabout of signs pointing to one another, but 
“pre-informed,” so to speak, of their ultimate function to signal to the bearer of a desire the existence, 
proximity or distance in space or time of relatively desirable or undesirable circumstances. (It could even 
be said that the capacity to distinguish percepts or concepts reflects the need to respect the axiological 
dichotomy—between what would lead to desirable or undesirable circumstances.)
     23. Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 180.
AMIEN KACOu 317
ing,” so to speak: there is no state of consciousness that is not value-laden. In other 
words, consciousness is, in every moment, either a satisfaction of a desire or another 
event within the quest for the satisfaction of a desire; experience is always “motivated.”
At the same time, we repeat, it is also clear that what we desire is not always some-
thing we conceive of distinctly in consciousness. In fact, what we think we desire is a 
function of capacities and circumstances—robust thinking or analysis, information, re-
action under stress, and so on—that could make us think we want what we do not want. 
(Consider, e.g., Oedipus’ case.)
c. The logic of  desire
It is impossible a priori to both actually want something to be the case and at the 
same time want it not to be the case: it is impossible to simply desire that any desire that 
we presently have not be satisfied (in which case it would not be desired). This is not 
withstanding the possibility of having, a posteriori, different, independent, circumstan-
tial desires simultaneously, therefore potentially conflicting. (Such conflicts of desires 
may occur on account of problems and dilemmas imposed by external circumstances, 
including defective judgment or insufficient information.) It is therefore also impossi-
ble to desire that our present generally consistent desires be extinguished before they 
are satisfied—regardless of whether or not our dispositions for them can crumble (from 
death, illness…). 
Two approaches remain—again, perhaps only nominally distinct: (1) whether it is 
also impossible ever to desire (a priori) no longer to desire anything in the future (which 
may depend on the kind of satisfaction involved, as discussed below), and (2) whether 
desire-as-such implicates a satisfaction with its own existence (which is another way of 
asking whether the mere fact that value exists can be said to be itself valuable). The first 
approach aims at determining the value of the survival of value or desire, and will be 
addressed below; the second approach aims at the value of the birth or mere existence 
of value, and needs not be addressed separately in the present inquiry.
d. Metaphysics of  desire
There are two fundamental general forms of desire: we can call them finite desire and 
infinite desire. A finite desire can only be satisfied with a limit: it is to be definitively sat-
isfied by a specific numerical value or a finite event in space-time—for example: going 
to the beach, or reaching sexual orgasm, or passing the bar exam, or ending a particu-
lar pain, etc… A finite desire is essentially circumstantial: the meeting of circumstances 
produces its terms and it reflects the limits that this meeting creates. An infinite desire, 
on the other hand, has no definitive satisfaction in number, space or time. for example, 
the desire for general pleasure (the desire to like how we feel) has clearly no temporal 
limit: it is constant; it aims at no final end.24 (Strictly speaking, nobody would like not 
     24. Could the same be said of the “will to power,” although the notion of power (including the capacity 
for orientation, for instance) could not be conceived without reference to a weight of circumstances to be 
COSMOS AND HISTOrY318
to like how he or she feels at any time—including masochists.) Accordingly, there can 
be no such thing as a particular pleasure that could satisfy all desire for pleasure “once 
for all.” In other words, the infinite desire for pleasure finds its highest satisfaction in 
continuity (or perpetuity). The greatness of Baudelaire’s poetry, when in The Bad Glazier 
(1862) he says, “what does an eternity of damnation matter to someone who has found 
in one second the infinity of pleasure?” is to be found precisely in the paroxysm that 
seems to make logic irrelevant.25 But it is, strictly speaking, impossible to find in finite 
time an infinity of pleasure, because finite time always entails finite space.
Within any particular moment of consciousness, both aspects of desire are present—
“perpendicular” to one another, as it were (like, say, particle and wave, or space and 
time). There is no one moment when we are awake when we do not entertain a finite 
desire, and there is no moment when we are awake when we do not have the infinite 
desire for pleasure.
e. The essential form of  desire
According to Schopenhauer, “all endeavor springs from deprivation—from discontent 
with one’s condition—and is thus suffering as long as it is not satisfied.”26 
One might imagine that “need” (in a sense implying imperfection, lack, deficiency, 
dependency, oppression, unsettlement) is the fundamental form of desire. And, accord-
ingly, just as the absence of such “need” is easily thought of as a state of “freedom” or 
“peace,” one could imagine that the disposition to care about things is essentially the 
expression of some kind of original, genetic “disturbance” from an ideal state of axi-
ological indifference (which could be the fundamental state of Nature, notwithstanding 
Schopenhauer’s theory of the Will as “thing-in-itself ”), and that the foundation of all 
moral concern is really a constant attempt to escape, or do away with, the oppression of 
having to care in the first place—and to near or return or otherwise reach that state of in-
difference (i.e., to die, if we assume that death is the end of experience). In other words, 
all desire would be traced back to a fundamental desire to stop desiring. Our not letting 
ourselves die easily (or killing ourselves), however, might then be explained by the dif-
ficulty of overcoming so sophisticated a form of oppression as to have befuddled us so 
dramatically or to have buried our behavioral capabilities under ranges and ranges of 
obstacles (in the form of our body’s reflexes, social norms, theologies, etc…). Hence, in 
this context, our survival instinct would, at best, appear essentially a psychological re-
straint reflecting the intricacy of our conditioning and, in effect, the depth of our captiv-
ity under the “bio-regime.” 
There is a critical problem with this reductive picture, however: it is based on a 
subtle misunderstanding of the form of desire (by Schopenhauer and others). 
We could approach this problem by noticing that the notion of desire as being, fun-
overcome?
     25. See Charles Baudelaire, Paris Spleen, New York, New Directions, 1970, p. 12.
     26. Arthur Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, David Berman (ed.), trans. Jill Berman, london, 
Everyman, 1995, p. 195.
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damentally, a disturbance—a problem—implies that all desires must be consistent with 
a preference that they could end “once for all” or had never existed. Pain, or suffering, 
is a problem precisely because we want it to disappear. (The “essential problem” in all 
problems, we could say, is that they exist.) under this logic, for all desires, one single 
great definitive satisfaction (end) would have to be superior to several satisfactions. Just 
as, by analogy, vaccines are superior to cures or therapies.
Accordingly, pleasure might have to be seen as a sort of consolation we reach for 
faute de mieux, while hoping for the coming of that ideal eschatological liberation that is 
death—even if we cannot normally think of it so straightforwardly. Pleasure would be 
basically indistinct from pain-relief. 
We have seen, however, that (1) it is impossible to desire that our present generally 
consistent desires be extinguished before they are satisfied, and (2) the general desire for 
pleasure naturally aspires a priori to continuous (or continual) satisfaction across time.27 
There can be no such thing as an ultimate pleasure that could satisfy all desire for pleas-
ure “once for all,” regardless of its nature or “intensity:” again, the desire for pleasure 
finds its highest satisfaction in continuity (or perpetuity). Accordingly, the desire for 
pleasure cannot be squarely reduced to a desire for the resolution of a problem—it is 
not merely the desire for the end of pain. The first is an infinite desire, and the second 
a finite desire (i.e., the desire for the end of pain would ideally be satisfied by a single 
event, such as the end of experience, but the desire for the continuation of pleasure 
could not). Therefore, it could not be the case that, for all desires, one single great defini-
tive satisfaction would be superior to several satisfactions. This should already suggest 
that the form of problems is not the essential form of all desire. 
Yet we can go further. The general form of desire is not that of a problem, but that 
of a stake (in french: enjeu). On the one hand, the general form of problems could be 
expressed as follows: “something is wrong.” Since it aims at an end, it does not entail 
definitive dissatisfaction; it entails hardship (which, sometimes at least, means the worsen-
ing of the conditions for satisfaction of a desire). In other words, a problem presents an 
obstacle that is not inherent to desire. It implicates, not only the elements of all quests 
(mainly, a consideration of time) but also, an additional element—a circumstance beyond 
the mere delay that time imposes. This entails that “lack of satisfaction” needs not be 
synonymous with “hardship,” or “dissatisfaction” for that matter. for example, suppose 
that I want to eat some ice cream tonight, and there is only one ice cream shop in town. 
If I drive to the shop and it is closed, then I am dissatisfied. If on my way to the shop I 
encounter a traffic jam just minutes before it is set to close, then I am experiencing hard-
ship. Merely driving to the shop (initially), however, neither dissatisfies me nor makes my 
dissatisfaction more likely, in the relevant sense.
On the other hand, the general form of stakes could be expressed as follows: “some-
     27. Perhaps just as the infinite desire for pleasure naturally aspires to continual satisfaction across time, 
a “one-time” finite desire (such as, say, the specific desire to receive a lifetime achievement award) would 
aspire to its own replication, if not simply to that of its kind, if it were otherwise possible (say, across 
worlds).
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thing can go wrong.” (As suggested earlier, contingency is essential to desire.) The es-
sential form of desire is not that of problems or obstacles, but that of the possibility of 
problems or obstacles. Schopenhauer’s understanding of the notion stems from a con-
fusion between the two—a confusion of modalities. “We feel as if we had to penetrate 
phenomena: our investigation, however, is directed not towards phenomena, but, as one 
might say, towards the ‘possibilities’ of phenomena.”28
It seems that a misleading analogy makes this confusion more likely. (“Philosophy 
points out the misleading analogies in the use of our language.”29) The analogy is based 
on facts such as that, as suggested earlier, vaccines are superior to cures or therapies—
in other words, it is better to be inoculated from a disease than it is to be cured of, or 
treated for, the disease. What escapes notice in this case is that what makes vaccines su-
perior is not that they may end the general possibility of disease (which they may not); it 
is that they may end (or reduce) some specific possibility (or likelihood) of disease. This 
distinction can be highlighted, for instance, in the fact that an actual measurement of 
risk could conceivably be assigned to the latter, whereas no such measurement could 
be assigned to the former. What makes us susceptible to the confusion is the same thing 
(whether shallow error in thinking or deep irrational paroxysm of desire) as what makes 
us believe that a “heaven” where nothing bad can occur is possible.
IV. IS lIfE “BETTEr THAN” DEATH A PrIOrI?
a. The value of  survival
We are now in a position to state an answer to our main question. As we have shown, 
we are animated (at the very least) by an infinite desire for pleasure and it is impossible 
to desire that our present generally consistent desires be extinguished before they are 
satisfied. Therefore, it is impossible to desire the end of what makes pleasure possible 
(namely, experience, “life”) unless perhaps pain is a constant of that condition—that is, 
unless life presents a constant problem. Indeed, according to Schopenhauer, “essentially 
all life is suffering.”30
We have seen that pain has the form of a problem—it signals non-definitive (thus 
temporary!) dissatisfaction with consciousness, or hardship. In other terms: [simple pain] = 
[(consciousness*desire) + obstacle]. On the other hand: [consciousness*desire] = [desire 
for satisfaction including pleasure]. Therefore: [Simple pain] = [desire for satisfaction 
including pleasure + obstacle]. Since, as shown above, consciousness is always an ex-
pression of desire, then [consciousness*desire] can be simplified to [consciousness]. 
In this way, pain can be seen to address an additional circumstance (the obstacle 
it signals) seemingly outside of the essence of consciousness. Nonetheless, perhaps we 
     28. ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, p. 42.
     29. ludwig Wittgenstein, The Big Typescript, p. 399.
     30. Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea, p. 197.
AMIEN KACOu 321
could imagine that such circumstance always subsists with consciousness, or even “pre-
cedes” it in some way (in which case, we might be more inclined to relax our restriction 
to a priori matters). What if, for instance, we were to theorize that the birth of conscious-
ness is explained by the circumstantial advantage it confers—say, toward organic survival, 
as aforesaid? (for instance, it provides a sense of orientation.) Perhaps this could be ex-
pressed by saying that, at its foundation, consciousness (“life” in the relevant sense) is an 
expression of a will to such power as would allow organisms to survive. It would return 
us to the view that consciousness is, at its essence, valuable as a security device or ca-
pacity instrumental to something else whose value could also be questioned. The issue 
would be whether that circumstantial advantage addresses an “obstacle” explaining the 
need for the advantage. If so, then the nature of the desire for pleasure could more ac-
curately be described, not as “infinite,” but rather as “indefinite”—pleasure would have 
value only so long as the advantage is needed.
However, such an image would also be the result of what we characterized earlier 
as a confusion of modalities. The fact is that the advantage, the power, which conscious-
ness is supposed to confer, fails as a whole to correspond to any problem or obstacle. 
Were the fundamental value of consciousness considered to be that it furthers our secu-
rity interests in general simply by ameliorating our capacity for orientation away from 
undesirable circumstances (relative to some desire other than that for pleasure), then 
the general “circumstance” that the advantage of having consciousness addresses could 
simply be described as follows: it is the fact that undesirable circumstances can exist. In 
other words, consciousness could be seen as an advantage vis-à-vis the simple fact that 
things can go wrong—which, as we have seen, is a condition of the existence of value itself. 
Thus the advantage would not be aimed at a problem or obstacle. rather, it would be 
aimed at the possibility of problems and obstacles, perfectly reflecting the form of desire 
itself. Accordingly, desiring the end of the condition for which the advantage is needed a 
priori would be the same as desiring the end of the possibility of problems, which, in turn, 
would be the same as desiring the end of desire—the disappearance of value.31
In sum: no problem for consciousness precedes or is inherent to consciousness, 
which indeed involves an infinite desire for pleasure. Therefore, it is false to say as Scho-
penhauer said that “essentially all life is suffering.” Whereas the end of pain can only be 
desired, it is impossible to desire the end of the essence of life, because it would have to 
involve a satisfaction with the end of an unproblematic infinite desire. In other words, 
we cannot help but desire the continuation of life-as-such: our survival is good a priori. 
life at its essence is not suffering—pain is an a posteriori (i.e., circumstantial) phenomenon 
of consciousness.
furthermore, since, as we have seen, life is an expression of desire (and no state of 
desire can be one of indifference), then life “at its essence” cannot be indifference. The 
value of our situated (i.e., a posteriori) experiences can be assumed to be entirely vari-
     31. Note also that were organic survival to be our fundamental desire, it would still not present us with a 
real problem, because an ending, a solution, could never satisfy it. (One cannot define a problem without a 
possible solution.) The advantage provided by consciousness could never cease to be an advantage.
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able. for instance, anyone of us could imaginably be born with a health condition that 
causes chronic headaches, or instead with a tendency for joyful reverie, or something 
else. However, the initial value of experience (to the extent we can distinguish experi-
ence from its objects—to the extent we commit to assign a value to all life in general) is 
the same for all.
It follows that life at its essence is pleasure. life inherently, initially, “produces” pleas-
ure. It “begins” as pleasure, so to speak, only to be countered, frustrated, a posteriori, by 
pain. (We can think of pain as thwarted pleasure—but not of pleasure as thwarted 
pain.)32 And the desire for pleasure appears more precisely as a quest, not really to find 
or discover pleasure,33 but rather to sustain (continue), and then augment (intensify) or 
expand (diversify) pleasure. 
In conclusion, since the infinite desire for pleasure finds its greatest satisfaction a 
priori in its own perpetuation, then life finds its greatest satisfaction a priori in its own per-
petuation. The fact that the circumstances of life (limited life expectancy, torture, etc…) 
do not allow, or frustrate, such perpetuation, however, forces us to reevaluate our death. 
But this issue belongs to another type of inquiry—on the subjective or circumstantial or 
a posteriori value of life.
b. The value of  birth
The above “demonstration” that our survival-as-such is good may also suggest that the 
mere fact that experience exists can be said to be a good thing. If experience (which we 
have shown to be an expression of desire) inherently produces pleasure (which is satis-
faction with experience), then there is a point at which, or a degree to which, we can 
treat desire and satisfaction interchangeably. Indeed, pleasure is produced not simply 
after it is desired, but while it is desired. Thus, it is perhaps possible, on this account, to 
suggest of the birth of the desire for pleasure that it is good. In any event, we cannot ra-
tionally prefer a priori not to have been born in the first place.
CONCluSIONS: THE VAluE Of lIfE, ETHICAl fOuNDATIONAlISM 
AND POST-THEISM
The universe we observe has precisely the properties we should 
expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no 
good, nothing but blind pitiless indifference.34
     32. One could also imagine pain as the effect of, or a sign for, the “gravitational pull” of death, so to 
speak.
     33. Notice also that pleasure (as the experience of liking, or the liking of experience) is not something that 
we can target or pursue at the exclusion of anything else. 
     34. richard Dawkins, river Out of  Eden: A Darwinian View of  Life (Science Masters Series), New York, 
BasicBooks, 1995, p. 133.
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a. Nihilistic theism:
In conclusion, we have shown that the desire for the good of life is a priori superior to the 
desire for the good of death—and that the good of life finds its highest form in its own 
perpetuation. 
We have also noted that circumstantial entanglements could conceivably make us 
think we want what we do not want. In other words, irrational behavior becomes pos-
sible: it becomes possible to find discrete pleasure in things that should not give us pleas-
ure—say, because they compromise access to greater pleasure. This explains why it be-
comes possible to even deny the value of life-as-such.
We can also reason that it is the circumstance that the perpetuation of life and pleas-
ure seems practically (i.e., a posteriori) impossible—because we believe we are mortal and 
expect to die—that forces us to, not only reevaluate our death but also, focus more on the 
other dimensions of pleasure (intensity and diversity). And, what is even more interest-
ing: it is the denial of the truth of this apparent circumstance, this imperfection of pleas-
ure, which forms the central concern of theological worldviews (which devalue pleasure 
in its finite form—at least, to the extent that it does not seem conditioned by them). This 
concern finds expression in two assertions: that experience belongs to an immortal soul; 
and that perfect pleasure is guaranteed in “heaven.”
*
“Heaven” is defined as a place where nothing bad can occur—a place where prob-
lems and dissatisfaction are not possible. (A place of absolute, necessary security.) As 
we have seen, however, any desire for such a place would seem to entail a desire for a 
place where value is no longer possible—because value always entails a preference over 
alternatives (one of which is bad). In other words, desiring to go to heaven would be the 
same as desiring the end of desire, the disappearance of value.
We need not investigate in detail the circumstances that make it possible to say that 
such a place ought to exist. (Perhaps it relates to a fear of Murphy’s law—“what can 
go wrong will go wrong.”)35 But we can “see” how tempting it is to say so, and thus un-
wittingly sacrifice the possibility of the good to the desire for its necessity. Those who 
commit to such a place, we call “greedy nihilists.” Hamlet, for instance, even though he 
does not actually mention a place we would call “heaven,” shows that he is a greedy ni-
hilist when he laments “outrageous fortune” to the point of finding value in the idea of 
the end of experience—he wishes that things in general were incapable of going wrong. 
(This is precisely the contrary of amor fati.) It is as if one needed to be able to believe in 
the possibility of a perfect, everlasting, totalitarian state of goodness in order to be able 
to find anything good at all.
Heaven can be defined as “God’s realm.” That “God” may be defined as an in-
escapable (perhaps even all-inclusive, somehow), eternally consistent, committed and 
supreme preference and power. Through these attributes, It makes heaven possible. 
Therefore, it is Its authority that conditions the possibility of the good itself (which for 
     35. This law needs not be true, it seems. Nor needs it matter that much if it is.
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greedy nihilists, as we have shown, is conditioned on the idea of its necessity). Thus, that 
“God” becomes the source or foundation of ethics and value.
Accordingly, when the idea that such a “God” does not exist becomes contemplat-
ed, the idea that the good itself does not exist also becomes contemplated. With the idea 
of the disappearance of the duty imposed by that “God” also comes the idea of the dis-
appearance of the good itself. Thus, it is as if the greedy nihilistic theist needed to feel 
compelled to love anything at all by such “God,” without which she would be terminally 
overcome with a sense of all-encompassing futility. In other words, she would become a 
passive nihilist—in the Nietzschean sense.
In sum, there would be two sides to this paradoxical coin we can now call the Ni-
etzschean God. On one side, it is something that guarantees the preservation of one’s 
“willingness to care,” so to speak, more or less like an anti-depressant. Because of im-
mortality and heaven, it becomes impossible to “lose” the world. On the other side, it is 
something that forces one to care. Because of immortality and hell, it becomes impos-
sible to “escape” the world—and costly to try to do so.
*
The Nietzschean God could perhaps be distinguished from the run of the mill “God,” 
perhaps more primitive, which is sought, not to provide a source or ground for the very 
possibility of value, but simply to provide marginal gain or good fortune—or perhaps a 
special kind of inspiration in the face of dismal odds. We could define this “God” broad-
ly as, “that which can help us in our darkest hours,” and, for contrast, baptize it “the 
Pascalian God”—solely as an evocation of the opportunism suggested by Blaise Pascal’s 
wager, and not necessarily as a claim regarding the wisdom of that wager as stated or 
of Pascal’s beliefs. To the opportunist, it is good if the Pascalian God exists, but it is not 
necessary that the Pascalian God exist for things to be good.
It is perhaps the temptation to further define the Pascalian God, in order to make 
It more predictable, that eventually leads us to conceive of the totalitarian Nietzschean 
God—inflating, in the process, the problem of fortune (chance), from a discrete, mar-
ginal, “quantized” phenomenon, so to speak, to a massive one.
b. Post-theism and axiological realism 
Post-theism needs not involve any negation of the existence of a particular “God.”36 It 
needs only involve a realization that we must find answers without reference to any such 
“God.”
The “cause” for the existence of value, like the ”cause” for the existence of con-
sciousness, is a matter open to speculation or theorizing. for instance, it may be that 
organic beings have a tendency to value things (to have preferences) simply by virtue of 
their contingent material constitution. In other words, Dawkins (in the epigraph above) 
     36. In fact, one might do very well to hope for something like the Pascalian God, at least on occasion.
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could be right. Or, it may be that our world (if modal realism makes sense) contains in its 
modal particularity a definitive “bias” which, somehow, immortal souls within it reflect 
in their innate sense of value. Whatever! for our purposes, the only difference would 
be that in one case the “force” of value would seem to come from the contingent forces 
that hold us together, whereas in the other it would appear to come from the fact that 
the finding of value is incidentally inescapable (i.e., because we just happen to live in that 
world with the relevant modal particularity). 
What must be understood is that neither “theory” should change anything to the 
“value of value.” 
*
An ethical foundation is “something for the sake of which everything else can be 
valued.”37 Greedy nihilists believe that an absence of external obligation (external force) 
at the foundation (or as the source) of value (desire) would eliminate value. However, we 
have seen that their worldview was founded on a desire for something that would make 
value impossible. Perhaps, then, something like “gratuity” (freedom) would best serve 
as “foundation.”
But such a “foundation” would seem to correspond to no foundation at all, except 
for the simple fact that we value things. It would not be conditioned upon any additional 
claims about other entities. And yet this would seem to make sense, since any such condi-
tioning (of the possibility of asserting value) would itself have to express (albeit indirectly) 
an assertion of value already preexisting that conditioning. What, then, when it presup-
poses that value exists, could such conditioning add to the possibility of that existence? 
(Or, perhaps more importantly, what might it subtract?) 
In other words, while we see that the constitution of all morality is twofold—in-
cluding (1) value (i.e., the fact that we value anything), and (2) the fact that the service 
of what we value may be conditioned38—we now also see that, however, we cannot 
meaningfully, by ourselves, place conditions for our valuing things in general, for valu-
ing things in the first place. 
In yet other words, we have seen that, in terms of general phenomena, care (value) 
“precedes” belief. Therefore, how could any belief—except the senseless (uninforma-
tive) belief that value exists—rationally condition value? More specifically, how could 
belief in a particular explanation for the existence of value condition value? (These are 
rhetorical questions.)
*
Value cannot be self-defeating—desire cannot desire its own dissatisfaction. Moreover, 
     37. ronald de Sousa, relativistic Foundationalism? Or Let’s All Go Back to Being Modern, at www.chass.utoronto.
ca/~sousa/foundism.html (last accessed on April 21, 2008).
     38. In other words, generally, it is the fact that the satisfaction of our desires may be conditioned that 
creates issues of morality.
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every moment in life expresses or pursues value. Accordingly, conscious behavior must 
always be limited to value-supporting actions—at least so long as external forces do not 
interfere. Therefore, even if it is imaginable that there exists outside of life a state of af-
fairs wherein there is no concern with things, and that such a state should in principle 
be accessible (if death is the end of experience), we nonetheless find ourselves incapable 
of truly desiring it as an end in itself. Hamlet’s lament (if sincere) was nothing more than 
the product of a special kind of confusion (or stupidity). 
In this sense, we are “trapped” in value—our “escape” could only come (directly at 
least, if at all) from the exterior. Perhaps then it follows that it is in those who depend 
on external references, or transcendental “truths,” to provide their axiological source or 
foundation that we truly begin to find the collapse of what makes value (and therefore 
morality) possible.
c. Temptation of  “meaning”
To ask for the meaning of life can be thought ultimately to ask what should be done 
with one’s time thought of as a whole (a single project). We have said more specifically 
that what we seek when we search for “the meaning of life” in the most basic or general 
sense can be one or both of two things: either it is an explanation for the fact that “life” 
as we know it exists, or it is a justification for our most basic (or “default”) desire to sur-
vive. We have also defined the word “meaningful” (as pertaining to life), for purposes of 
our inquiry, as being basically synonymous with the word “useful”—a relation between 
objects and moments, on the one hand, and how what we value can be served, on the 
other hand. 
On the one hand, one who seeks an explanation for the fact that life exists may well 
seek no more than an inspiration to, as it were, shape her life. On the other hand, one 
who seeks a justification for our most basic desire to survive seems to seek an inspiration 
to want a life. What we have attempted to show can be stated as follows: that wanting to 
live is an a priori aspect of life—in other words, life has value a priori, irrespective of any 
explanation regarding its existence. 
As we have shown that life-as-such (the general condition of experience) has, at 
the very least, the unproblematic value of pleasure (the liking of experience, or the ex-
perience of liking things), then the service of pleasure could be seen as that object or 
moment in life that is sufficiently “meaningful” in serving what we value. furthermore, 
since value-as-such could not be conditioned by any explanation, then the very exist-
ence of unproblematic value in life could not rationally be conditioned on one expla-
nation or another for the existence of life. It is not simply that we have some subjective 
desire for life, but that living things cannot help but desire life a priori.
Accordingly, we should be able to see life as an end in itself. Although one explana-
tion, as opposed to another, for the existence of life could depict a better overall situation 
for life (e.g., one that would involve immortality), we must fight the temptation to believe 
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